William C. Robinson explores how the breakdown in communications between General Lee and Major General Stuart led to the Confederacy's great failure at Gettysburg.
"I must go over the ground again."
- Edmund Blunden, Undertones of War
Why do we need another book on such a time-worn topic as the Gettysburg campaign of the American Civil War? William C. Robinson’s impetus for producing a new work is straightforward: the failure of General Robert E. Lee’s cavalry commander, Major-General James Ewell Brown ‘Jeb’ Stuart, to appear at Gettysburg on July 1, 1863 to support the Army of Northern Virginia’s invasion of Pennsylvania, has been widely assumed one of the prime reasons Gettysburg proved a major blow to the Confederacy. In the month prior to the battle of Gettysburg, Stuart had broken contact with Lee for several critical days, and his were the only substantive body of cavalry with the experience and resources to screen Lee from Union forces.
Prior to Gettysburg, Stuart’s raids on Union camps greatly aided Lee in his victory at Second Manassas; his maneuvering impeded the flow of Union General George McClellan’s forces, and he proficiently kept Lee informed of the intentions or whereabouts of Union generals Ambrose Burnside and Joseph Hooker, thus facilitating Lee’s victories at Fredericksburg and Chancellorsville. An atmosphere of trust was reinforced between Lee and Stuart. However, the picture began to muddle around June of 1863 as Stuart let the more cavalier part of his personality assume eminence over his operational imperative to screen Lee’s Army.
In the development of his thesis Robinson does not discount other factors impacting Stuart’s actions such as terrain, the availability of fords across strategic rivers – major considerations for maneuverability and logistics, and whether or not Stuart’s actions were sparked by a desire to avenge his cavalry’s beating at Brandy Station early in June, 1863. Nonetheless, much “of the legendary elusiveness of Lee’s army was due to Stuart’s skill at providing it with an impenetrable screen of cavalry scouts.” Had Stuart been in a tactically sound position he could have disrupted the Union army’s excellent spy network. Moreover, Lee feared that the lack of news from Stuart meant his faithful cavalry commander had been defeated at last.
Lee trusted Stuart to use the good sense and discretion he’d exercised in the recent past, but the cavalry commander chose instead to embark on a deleterious raiding spree that only harassed – but did not delay – the pace of the Union forces’ march across the Potomac on their way to counter Lee. By the time Stuart’s men arrived at Gettysburg it was far too late for them to make an impact on the battle. Only “if Stuart had achieved surprise and gained the Union rear ‘unhindered’ can one imagine his movement’s having an impact on the outcome on Cemetery Ridge.” In the end, Robinson does not elide wider factors concerning Stuart’s actions, and Lee remains accountable for the overall loss of the battle as his orders to Stuart should have been more explicit.
Robinson’s research is extensive; he culled over 145 primary and secondary sources, many of them among academic heavy-hitters of Civil War history. He includes fifteen pages of notes, four theater-level maps, and several photos and battlefield sketches relative to the Gettysburg campaign. It is unlikely that Robinson’s work will satisfy all Civil War scholars and students; but whatever its eventual reception in academic circles this is an enthralling work of history.
Jeffrey C. Alfier, a Southwest regionalist poet, divides his time between Tucson and Germany. He holds an MA in Humanities from California State University at Dominguez Hills. A member of Poets Against War, he has been reviewing books of poetry for several years. His first chapbook, "Strangers Within the Gate" (2005), was published by The Moon Publishing and Printing, based in Tucson.
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